Abstract-We propose in this paper a new approach to channel key management in the architecture S-SSM, we designed to secure SSM communication. S-SSM defines two mechanisms for access control and content protection. The first one is carried out through subscriber authentication and access permission. The second is realized through the management of a unique key, called the channel key, k ch , shared among the sender and subscribers. The management of k ch is based on a novel distributed encryption scheme that enables an entity to efficiently add and remove a subscriber without affecting other subscribers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The IP multicast model [4] is appeared as a way to optimize the communication used by multimedia applications (audio and video conferences, video diffusion) involving several participants. Today, we can see that commercial multicast deployment is not a reality yet. Moreover, the IP multicast model presents some limits on issues such as scalable routing, address allocation, and notably security. Indeed, any host can send data to any IP multicast address and any host can join any group.
In order to overcome these problems, some simplified approaches have been proposed. Express [10] has defined a point-to-multipoint diffusion, and presents a group as a tuple (S, E), where S is the unique sender address and E a multicast destination address. The tuple (S, E) is called channel. Simple Multicast [13] is similar to Express but uses a bidirectional tree like CBT [12] . These different approaches, known as Source Specific Multicast (SSM) have been standardized in IETF with the proposal of PIM-SSM [6] , a modified version of PIM-SM [11] which allows source-filtering. Subscription to channels is supported by IGMP Vers.3 [9] , called IGMP specific-source [8] . The SSM scheme presents a solution for allocation and routing problems and provides partial access control.
But for an effective commercial deployment of SSM, security services such as access control and content provider protection are required. In [1] , we proposed a new architecture for securing SSM that can provide an environment for multimedia diffusion; we refer to this as S-SSM. The diffusion environment is basically composed of SSM (PIM-SSM/IGMPv3) routing, video server and potential receivers.
Our S-SSM architecture addresses two security services and mechanisms to support them. These are access control and content protection. The access control service and mechanisms are an extension of the solution proposed in [5] which uses a signed token to control access to group communication. The aim of this solution is to authenticate members using their local routers and to protect membership demands against attacks. Content protection is achieved via sender authentication and data ciphering. The last one requires the management of a unique key, called the channel key, k ch , shared among the sender and subscribers.
In this paper, we propose a new approach to channel key management. The new approach is based on a new publickey distributed encryption scheme, proposed by MU and VI-JAY [3] . It enables the owner of the channel to robustly add or remove any subscriber by sending only one multicast message and without any additional computation for the subscribers. This paper is organized as follow. In Section 2, we outline the S-SSM architecture. Section 3 details the novel distributed encryption scheme used to manage the channel key. Finally, Section 4 concludes with some remarks.
II. S-SSM ARCHITECTURE
Let us now consider in detail the S-SSM architecture and explain how these offered services are applied at the time of subscription and content diffusion.
A. S-SSM overview
Our S-SSM architecture proposes that the actors of the diffusion environment, notably the IGMPv3-capable routers, would be responsible for the security of the channel. The reasons for this are as follows:
• The first one is to control some events that could compromise the network resources, in particular, the multicast routers. When one entity sends a subscription request, i.e, an IGMPv3-report, the first router receiving the request must be capable of sealing the request's fate. Indeed, if the entity meets certain conditions imposed by the channel security, the router can follow up the subscription request. In this way, we limit as much as possible any network resource wastage. Moreover, every malicious request is prevented from illegal access to channel flow.
• The second aspect is a scalability concern. The decentralized management of channel security is more flexible than the centralized one. In other words, instead of having only one entity controlling all the security operations within the channel, entities distributed within domains where we have subscribers, can be delegated to do some security tasks. There are many advantages for this choice. The propagation of control messages will be limited to only domains where the subscription requests are issued. Moreover, the subscription latency to a channel is minimized and the bottleneck for the entity responsible for the security management is avoided. So, the channel manager delegates the security tasks to the actors of the diffusion environment. S-SSM defines four security actors ( Fig. 1 [7] , which allows it to extend the delegation of the secured environment to a domain larger than a local area network. Channel Controller can be any local or global controller.
• Directory Server, DS. The service provider stores all information related to his clients or subscribers and needed to the management of the channel in a server, called the Directory Server, DS. DS has one entry per subscriber. An entry can include several fields such as Validity to prove that the entry is valid, Start date and End date indicating the beginning and ending dates of a subscription, and a specific nonce, Ns, attributed randomly to the subscriber. GC has only read access to DS. An example of a DS could be a LDAP server [2] . • Subscriber. Any entity which can receive channel flow and has paid a subscription fee, according to the service agreement with the service provider. Prior to subscription, the new subscriber must have a valid entry in the DS server. The valid entry defines the access permission. According to the server DS, the GC and local controllers create a global recovery list, RECOV List, composed of entities which have compromised or tried to compromise the channel security. A member of this list has no more access to channel data. In addition, every LC has a list of local subscribers, LOCALSUB List. This list is updated after every join or eviction of a subscriber. A LC distributes the key k ch only to members of the list LOCALSUB SUB.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss how the access control is performed.
B. Access control
In the following, we assume that a local controller is an SSM-capable router (IGMPv3/PIM-SSM) and that IGMPv3 defines a type of message which recognizes the definition of a signed token. The signed token forms an essential part of the authentication process of exchanged messages. A token is composed of:
* Ns, a specific number attributed by the service provider at the time of subscription and payment to the channel service, * The tuple (S, ch), where S is the address of the source and ch is the channel destination address; * Timestamp, * The IP address of the subscriber. Remark 1 For a signed token of a local controller, the field Ns will be ignored or set to zero. It should be noted that the role of a token is to protect a non-secure subscription request against attacks.
As mentioned in Section 2, the subscription phase is carried out in two steps:
• Authentication carried out by a local controller.
• Access permission check done by the global controller. In the following paragraphs, we present the access control service using the scenario depicted in Figure 1 , which shows the subscription of the host h to a channel (S, ch). We assume that a local controller is on the SSM tree.
1) Authentication: The entity, h, which wants to subscribe to the channel, sends a subscription message, n • 1 as shown in Figure 1 . It is composed of an IGMPv3-report with ch as the channel destination address and with S as the address of the channel source. This message is protected by the signed token of h. h sends the message to its local controller. On receipt of this message, the LC authenticates the sender. We assume that the LC knows the public keys of hosts within its domain.
If the authentication process succeeds, the LC checks whether h is not in the RECOV List. If not, it must verify with the GC whether h has the right to access the channel (S, ch). If the authentication process fails or if h is in the list RECOV List, then the message will be ignored. This step triggers the next step, which is the validity check.
2) Validity check: The purpose of this step is to verify with the GC whether the new subscriber has a valid entry in the DS server. The LC sends a message to GC, n • 2 in Figure 1 . This message contains the signed tokens of LC and the new subscriber.
By receiving this message, the GC authenticates first the LC. Then, if successful, it authenticates the host and checks with the DS server its Ns for the required channel and its validity period. This is done with the message n • 3 in Figure 1 . This message is acknowledged by the DS with message n • 4. If the answer is positive, then the GC confirms the validity of the subscription by sending the message n • 5. This message contains the signed token of the host, the token of the GC and Start date, End date which indicate the beginning and the expiration validity of the subscription. In fact, these fields together with the subscriber's Ns form the access permission to the channel.
At the reception of this message, the LC interprets this message as follows:
* III. CHANNEL KEY MANAGEMENT Channel rekeying should take place after the following:
• reception of a new subscription request in order to avoid the subscriber from accessing an old channel traffic ; • access permission expiration or eviction of a subscriber in order to avoid access to future channel flow; • the periodicity of channel rekeying in order to avoid key forging In this section we explain how GC distributes securely k ch to subscribers via the intermediate of LCs. The distribution of k ch is based on the public-key distribution encryption scheme proposed in [3] . A distributed encryption system consists of a manager and several users who form a group. The group manager has two major tasks: constructing a unique group public key and performing revocation. Each member has a private decryption key that can be used for decryption. The group possesses a unique group public key that maps to all private keys owned by its members. A message encrypted using the group public key can be decrypted using any one of these private keys.
In our architecture, the GC and any LC act as a group manager. First, the GC uses encryption key to encrypt the channel key k ch that is then transmitted to LCs. Secondly, every LC acts as group manager within its domain. A LC uses the encryption key to encrypt k ch received from GC and then transmits it to its subscribers, who possess a private decryption key to decrypt k ch .
The major task of constructing such a public-key distribution system is to find an algorithm where a public key maps to several associated private decryption keys. In the following, we describe such a distributed encryption scheme.
A. Distributed Encryption Algorithm
The security of this system relies on difficulty of computing discrete logarithm. The protocols are based on a polynomial function and a set of exponentials. Let p be a large prime, Z * p be a multiplicative group of order q where q|p−1, and g ∈ Z * p be a generator. Let x i ∈ R Zq for i = 0, 1, 2..., n be a set of integers. The polynomial function of order n is constructed as follows.
where {a i } are coefficients:
This property is important for us to construct the distributed encryption system. Having the set {a i }, we can then construct the corresponding exponential functions, {g
All elements are computed under modulo p. For convenience, we will omit modulo p in the rest of this paper. Note that n i=0 g xi i = 1. Now we are ready to construct an asymmetric-key system where the encryption key is the tuple {g 0 , g 1 , · · · , g n } mapping to n decryption keys {x i }. Let H be a strong one-way hash function and M be the message to be sent to a recipient by the sender who possesses the encryption key. The idea of this protocol is for the sender to encrypt a message M using the encryption key and produce the corresponding ciphertext that can be decrypted by anyone who has a private key,
To encrypt a message M , the sender picks a random number k ∈ R Zq, computes k = H(M ) and encrypts M using the encryption key to obtain the ciphertext c = (c 1 , c 2 ) , where
Since each recipient has his/her own private decryption key and each of these can be used to decrypt the ciphertext, each recipient can obtain M . The decryption process is as follows. 
B. System Setup
As mentioned before, the GC or any LC can act as a group manager. A group manager needs to prepare the encryption key and all decryption keys for its subscribers. The subscribers for the GC are the LCs and those for a LC are the subscribers of the diffusion channel. We assume that the channel controllers have sufficient computational power, whereas subscribers have limited computational power. In the following we explain the system set up for a group manager (ie GC and any LC).
We assume that the system has the upper limit, n, for the maximum number of subscribers. The actual number of subscribers is say m for 0 < m ≤ n. The difference between n and m will be used for adding new subscribers to the system. The construction of the encryption key and decryption keys follow the steps given below:
• Select n distinct random numbers x i ∈ R Zq for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, which form a set X n and a subset X m ⊂ X n .
•
We will see later that the group manager (broadcaster) needs only to compute A once.
• Select an integer b ∈ R Zq and compute its multiplicative inverse b −1 such that bb −1 = 1modq.
n j modq, where s = s 1 s 2 · · · s n , and s i s i modq = 1, ∀s i ∈ Zq, i.e., the multiplicative inverse is itself. It is easy to see that it can be realised by simply setting q = s i (s i − 1)/k for an integer k such that q + 1 is still a prime. The solutions of s i can be found if 1 + 4kq = X 2 where X is an odd number. It is not difficult to see that there are infinite solutions when we let k be k (1 + k q) for an integer k . These values satisfy the equality:
A is kept by the group manager and will be used as the encryption key for broadcasting the channel key K ch . Since the encryption key is not public, there is no need for us to protect it against any illegal modification.
x j andx j are given to subscriber j as its secret decryption key during the process of its subscription to the channel.
C. Broadcasting Protocol
We show in the following how the channel key is distributed securely to subscribers by the intermediate of LCs, using the distributed encryption system. The unique encryption key A of GC is used for the encryption of K ch . Any LC who has a legitimate private decryption key can decrypt them. The broadcasting protocol is given as follows:
• GC Selects an integer k ∈ R Zq,
• Computes the ciphertext c = K ch A sk , and
• Broadcast the triplet (ḡ,ĝ, c) to all LCs. To decrypt it, the LC j computes
Next, every LC uses its unique encryption key A for the encryption of K ch . Then, it follows the step from 1) to 4) accomplished by the GC. To decrypt it, the subscriber j computes cĝx jḡxj = K ch .
D. Removing a Subscriber
There are two schemes for removing a subscriber.
1) Scheme 1:
To remove a subscriber γ from the list or x γ from X m , its LC needs to
• Compute a new parameter d = g −xγ .
To broadcast the channel key, the controller now needs to compute the ciphertext in terms of
The broadcasted token consists of (ḡ,ĝ, c ), whereḡ = g s k andĝ = g s bk . To decrypt it, the subscriber j computes c ĝx jḡxj = K ch .
2) Scheme 2:
This scheme is much simpler than the first scheme. The channel controller does not need to reconstruct the encryption key A. Instead, the broadcaster just recomputes s such that the s γ for the subscriber to be removed is moved from the computation, i.e., s = n i=1,i =γ s i . Under this scheme, the broadcasting protocol given before can still be used without any modification. The removed subscriber cannot decrypt K ch since s γ s = s modq, while other subscribers can still decrypt K ch as usual. Remark 2: The GC can do the same thing in order to remove LCs.
E. Adding a Subscriber
There are two methods for a LC to add a new subscriber to the system.
1. The first approach makes use of an element in the spare set X n −X m . Recall that we have assumed that the actual number of subscribers is less than n, i.e., m < n or X m ⊂ X n . To add a new subscriber, the LC just simply moves one unused element from X n − X m to X m . For convenience, we still denote by X m the new set. Suppose that the new subscriber is denoted by subindex and is givenx andx as his/her decryption key doublet. 2. The second approach reuses x γ , after x γ ∈ X m has been removed from the system. Once x γ has been removed from the system, the corresponding party γ is no longer able to decrypt K ch . However, because x γ still exists in X m , it is perfectly legal for the channel controller to reuse it, provided that the removed subscriber γ cannot gain anything from it. The algorithm for the channel controller to reuse x γ is actually simple; for a new subscriber r the LC needs only to generate a new "s r " and compute a new "s" by replacing s γ with s r , i.e., 
F. Analysis
In this section, we outline the computations involved in the setup and operation of the system. We derive the number of operations involved in computing A, performing encryptions and decryptions as well as for adding and removing subscribers.
In terms of performance,the main objective of the proposed distributed encryption scheme is to reduce the amount of computations that need to be done during system operation. This resulted in a trade off and the bulk of computations being done at system set up time. This is advantageous as it can be done before system operation and more importantly by the broadcaster rather than the service subscribers.
Here are the rough estimates of exponentiation operations ( Table I )that need to be done in the various computations. Note these operations are modulo operations. As far as the computation of A is concerned at system setup time, it requires of the order of n 2 exponentiations where n is the number of subscribers. Recall that in our scheme, n is greater than the actual number of subscribers at a given time m and the difference is being used to add new subscribers. The computation required to perform decryption is of the order of 3 exponentiations. With encryption, in general it is 2 exponentiations, though after removal of a subscriber, there will be a need to perform 3 more exponentiation operations. The removal operation with scheme 2 requires 2 additional exponentiations from the broadcaster side and addition does not involve any exponentiation operation. Hence it can be seen that the proposed scheme is very efficient when it comes to normal system operation and updating of subscribers. 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have proposed a security architecture for source specific multicast (SSM) communications. The architecture enables legitimate subscribers to have secure access to channel flow in a dynamic environment. The access control service protects the network resources against illegitimate subscription requests. It is realized through checking and enforcing access permissions to a channel after authentication. The confidentiality and sender authentication are achieved through the establishment and management of the channel key shared between the source and the subscribers of the channels. Then we have proposed the application of a novel distributed encryption scheme for dynamic group management. The presented scheme is efficient when it comes to addition and removal of subscribers. These are done without affecting the rest of the subscribers. We have also briefly outlined the amount of computations involved in secure communications as well as the addition and deletion of members. We are currently exploring a larger scale implementation of the proposed scheme.
